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The protracted conflict in the Niger Delta communities is currently being diagnosed with a view to understanding the 
nature of the resource struggle. From the 1980s, the region’s cry of marginalization and exclusion from oil revenue 
allocation was couched in a wave of environmentalism. Environmental activism had assumed the shape of peaceful 
community protests against the transnational oil companies and was largely directed at ecological remediation and 
environmental justice. Environmentalism has now assumed new dimensions both in demands and strategy. The struggle 
has advanced to a low intensity conflict ostensibly against the state which has resulted in the militarization of the region. 
Although amnesty has been granted the militants by the federal government since October 2009 as a first step to 
resolving the conflict, there has been criticism trailing its framing and implementation that did not take into account some 
historical and socio-political antecedents of conflicts in the region. This paper revisits these and applies the greed and 
grievance framework to investigate the nature of the conflicts. It examines the pattern of environmentalism and discusses 
the complex nature of the conflicts against the curtailment of primordial motivations if environmental justice is to be 
achieved. Contrary to the literature, it demonstrates how grievance may manifest in greed in a mutually reinforcing 
pattern.
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Introduction 
In the last five decades, the oil-rich Niger Delta communities have predicated their abject poverty, environmental 
degradation, and the general underdevelopment of their area on the economic marginalization and socio-political 
exclusion from revenue allocation by the federal government. Not surprisingly, the Niger Delta struggle has been 
characterized by a clamour for self-determination manifesting in the guise of agitations for economic justice, resource 
control, environmental security, political representation and even secession, as shown by the Biafra-Nigeria Civil War 
which lasted for three years, from 1967 to 1970 (Nwajiaku-Dahou 2009; Okonta 2008). This seems in line with 
continued global emphasis on the need for “security-development nexus” (Stern and Ojendal 2010:5)
Environmental activism in the region was globalised in the 1980s and 1990s courtesy of the campaigns waged by 
writer and environmentalist Kenule Saro-Wiwa on the platform of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People 
(MOSOP). The flawed trial and execution of Saro-Wiwa and eight others of his Ogoni kinsmen by the Nigerian state 
further accentuated the globalization and eventual radicalization of the Niger Delta struggle (Wiwa 2005; Rowell et al. 
2005). Violent campaigns by militant youths locally and the Commonwealth of Nations’ sanctions against Nigeria in 1999 
gave impetus to environmental issues at the national and international levels. However, since 1999 some indigenes of the 
Niger Delta area have been appointed to key national positions, including ministerial appointments. And after initial 
resistance, the Ijaw-born Vice-President Goodluck Jonathan was elevated to the post of Acting President on February 9, 
2010 as a result of the debilitating ill-health of President Umaru Yar’Ardua. Jonathan was elected Nigeria’s President in 
May 2011. 
Other fence mending actions were taken by the government. From 2000, the federal government began the 
implementation of the increased derivation-based oil-revenue sharing formula to the oil-bearing Niger Delta region. The 
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revenue distribution formula to the region had been increased to 13 percent from a negligible 3 percent in 1999. These 
moves culminated in a sort of deference to the Ijaw tribe, the largest ethnic group in the Niger Delta and the fourth 
largest in Nigeria.
With the increase, the Niger Delta oil-producing states, especially Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers became 
awash with huge revenues. Added to this monthly revenue allocation from the federal centre has been a steady inflow of 
internally generated revenues as well as development funds from international organizations (Iyayi 2005). Also, the oil 
multinationals operating in the Niger Delta had been forced through incessant disruptions of operations to increase their 
community development funds to their host communities (Shell 2007). Ironically, however, rather than dousing the flames 
of conflict, these revenue inflows have more or less fed and exacerbated them (Eberlein 2006).
This paper draws on both primary and secondary sources of data to examine the trajectory of the conflict and its 
ubiquitous nature and functions. Briefly, it scans the recent amnesty package and problems facing its implementation. The 
paper makes a contribution by shedding light on the relationship between greed and grievance in the Niger delta conflicts 
and offers plausible explanations why stability and development remain largely elusive in the area despite the emergence 
of democratic rule and policies and actions deferring to the region. It suggests that oil wealth will continue to fuel 
insecurity in so far as good governance is elusive, injustice is perpetrated, and violence is rewarded. 
The paper is structured into five parts: the first part introduces the study; the second spells out the theoretical 
framework of the study; the third section characterizes the Niger Delta region focusing mainly on its strategic importance 
and conflict dynamics. The fourth explains the changing contours of the conflict as well as the functions of violence, and 
the fifth section concludes.
Conceptual and theoretical framework
Scholars are increasingly linking resource conflicts to greed and at other times grievance. Yet the interrelationship 
between the two has implications for conflict and development. After the Second World War, there was the belief that 
the endowment of natural resource wealth would bring about socio-political and economic development to resource-
endowed states. But rather than engendering development, resource dependence has been found to be inimical to 
growth and a catalyst for conflict especially in developing countries (Humphreys et al. 2007; Le Billon 2001; Auty 1993). In 
fact, most natural resource-endowed states have performed worse in terms of democracy and development than their 
counterparts which lack such natural endowments. According to analysts, most developing natural resource-dependent 
states suffer from ‘resource curse’ which manifests in the forms of poor economic growth and exposure to shock, low 
income and standards of living, poverty and inequalities, corruption, poor governance, and civil war (Gary and Karl 2003; 
Ross 2003).
The greed and grievance framework is a major contribution to the natural resource-conflict debate. The model has 
been popularised by Paul Collier and his associates as well as the World Bank. In recent times, this paradigm has been 
used extensively in analysing civil wars and conflicts in Africa, especially in resource-endowed but conflict-torn states such 
as Sierra Leone, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo, to mention only a few. Some of the central ideas of the greed 
and grievance thesis regarding rebellion as criminality, rebel discourse as propaganda, and the functionality of violence in 
conflicts are relevant to this paper (Keen 2008; Collier 2007). 
First, proponents of the greed thesis maintain that the availability of natural resources in a country causes conflicts 
because the huge rents that accrue from such resources serve ‘as spoils for potential rebels’ who instrumentalise violence 
in order to capture such rents extra-legally (Keen 2006; Collier 2000a). These advocates argue that civil wars and 
rebellion are chiefly motivated by greed, even though grievance is often declared as the propelling motive of such 
conflicts. The dismissal of grievance as a possible cause of rebellion is predicated on the fact that “justice, revenge, and 
relief from grievance” are public goods and therefore susceptible to collective action and free-rider problems (Collier 
2000a:98). This means that aggrieved people as in the case of the Niger Delta are likely to resist fighting and allow other 
aggrieved people to do the fighting while everyone will enjoy the benefits. 
Secondly, rebellion is equated to organised crime. This is because it thrives only through predatory activities such as 
the levying of protection charges, extortion, sales of extraction rights (‘booty future’), and ransom kidnapping that render 
the organization viable (Bannon and Collier 2003). Rebel groups are not only political organizations claiming to be 
pursuing social change, but they are also military and business organizations. As military outfits, they face the “problems of 
recruitment, cohesion, equipment, and survival” (Collier et al. 2003:67). As business organizations, rebellions are faced 
with financing problems. Several people have to be fed, clothed and housed. Also, some operational activities have to be 
financed, including arms purchase. Yet, revenues do not accrue directly from the military activities. For rebel groups to 
survive as military and business organizations they must engage in criminal activities. It is argued that most grievance-
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driven rebellions cannot meet the start-off threshold, making greed-based uprisings more realistic in societies 
characterized by huge commodity exports and a high proportion of poorly educated young men (Collier 2000a). 
Further, those (see Collier 2000b; Oyefusi 2008) who see rebellion as crimes argue that rebels deliberately misinform 
and mislead people by their narrative of grievance, hence should not be listened to. The propaganda of grievance is a 
functional deployment to garner some sympathy and legitimacy from members of the public, arguing that “the true cause 
of much civil war is not the discourse of grievance but the silent force of greed” (Collier 2000a: 98-101). In the same vein, 
de Soysa (2000) agrees with Collier that conflict is driven by rapacity rather than scarcity and that greed-driven rebellion 
is more likely to succeed than when motivated by grievance. 
In contrast, Korf’s (2005) study of Sri Lanka shows that greed and grievance can be closely interwoven, and should not 
be dichotomised or seen in antagonistic terms. This rather holistic approach is the focus of this paper. Indeed, Malone 
(2003: viii) argues that “the pursuit of economic self-interest and of redress for legitimate grievance is neither mutually 
exclusive nor static goals”. The character and dynamics of conflict have been known to be highly fluid as the cases of 
Angola, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo demonstrate (Ballentine and Sherman 2003). Even 
combatants whose motivations were initially driven by grievance have colluded with rebels and have also become linked 
to primitive resource accumulation (Keen 2008 and 2005; Cater 2003). 
This paper questions the reductionism inherent in the greed thesis. As will be seen, the case of Nigeria’s Niger Delta 
suggests that the weakness of the greed paradigm relates to the greed-grievance dichotomy. Both variables do actually 
co-exist and even re-enforce each other in the Niger Delta conflicts. Despite the ambivalent character of some militants, 
their discourse remains salient because of the historic marginalization of the region and the avarice of the political elite. 
Both religious politics and ethnic fractionalization featured prominently in fuelling the low-intensity conflict in the Delta in 
contradistinction to the findings of the proponents of the greed thesis that these factors are not significant in conflict 
initiation and transformation (Oyefusi 2008, Collier et al. 2003). However polarised the model, the merit of the greed 
thesis is the emphasis it places on the motivations of conflict actors and their instrumentalization of violence for economic 
agendas, which are the focus of this paper. 
The Niger Delta: mapping the trajectories of the struggle
In several respects, Nigeria is a violently divided country. Depending on the criteria for measurement, it has between 
250-400 ethnic groups (Mustapha 2007). These groups are divided into ‘ethnic majority’ and ‘ethnic minority’ based on 
their population size. There are three major ethnic groups in Nigeria, namely Yoruba in the South-West, Igbo in the 
South-East and Hausa-Fulani in the North. The Hausa-Fulani are predominantly Muslim and have with the aid of military 
rule dominated the political landscape of Nigeria since independence in 1960. The Igbo, on the other hand, are mainly 
commerce motivated; while the Yoruba have almost an even distribution of both Muslim and Christian adherents. There 
are also a few followers of traditional African religion among the Yoruba. In addition to this tripartite ethnic structure 
there are over 250 other smaller ethnic minorities. These include Tiv, Kanuri and Nupe in the North, and Ijaw, Ibibio, Efik 
and Edo in the South among several others, making Nigeria a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-linguistic, and multi-
regional federation (Suberu 2006). While the ethnic minorities in the North are concentrated in the North-Central, those 
in the South are mainly in the oil-rich Niger Delta region which is geo-politically referred to as the South-South.
Nigeria is Africa’s largest and most enduring federal experimentation. It is famous for its adroit usage of the federal 
option and institutional framework to “manage cultural-territorial pluralism and conflict” (Suberu 2006:65). As a three-
tier federation, it has thirty six states, a Federal Capital Territory (Abuja), and 774 local government areas. Despite nearly 
five decades of independent existence, Nigeria has not been able to evolve national unity amongst its diverse ethno-
religious configurations because of the politics of the ‘National Question’. The National Question has to do with efforts 
and plans to “reach a broad consensus for a just and equitable basis through which the diverse nationalities in Nigeria can 
unite, and pursue a common destiny of national development as Nigerians” (Obi 2002:106). It has become an apt 
euphemism to denote a divisive conflict ridden state that lacks coherence necessary for national unity and statehood. The 
federal experiment has been characterized by hyper-centralization as a result of oil politics, prolonged military 
dictatorship and minority marginalization by the majority. The politicization of the national question and sharing of the 
country’s oil wealth has led to a low intensity conflict in the Niger Delta.
The Niger Delta is rich in natural resources especially oil and gas reserves. It covers an extensive area of 70,000 kilo-
metres with about 12 million people (about 15 percent of Nigeria’s over 140 million people based on the 2006 census). It 
is one of the most endowed regions of the world. Its mangrove forests extend over 3,750 square miles and its oil, Bonny 
Light, is one of the most sought after in the world market (Watts 2007; Stern 2005). The region’s oil wealth is the source 
of Nigeria’s black gold which makes the country the sixth largest oil exporter in the world thereby generating up to 40 
percent of Nigeria’s GDP, 70 percent of government revenues and about 90 percent of all government receipts (Ikelegbe 
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2006). Table 1 shows the percentage contribution of each Niger Delta state to the national account, though this is subject 
to market fluctuation and insecurity that in turn affects production.
In spite of the immense human and mineral endowments, Nigeria is a rich country with poor people because its 
enormous wealth is concentrated in the hands of a small, powerful elite. Systemic corruption, poor mismanagement and 
underdevelopment have characterized the utilization of the Nigerian state’s resources (Okonta 2008; Omeje 2006). The 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) of the mid-1980s had further deepened the economic crisis in the country. Aus-
terity measures engendered by SAP had exacerbated the strained poverty conditions that quickly festered into tribal con-
flicts and contests for supremacy and access to resources. According to Olawale and Alao (2007:6) “the harsh 
environments that characterized SAP meant that Africa’s youth have been disadvantaged from birth.” This unenviable re-
ality continues to have implications for their behaviour especially from frustration among the large brigade of unemployed 
youths, some of whom resort to criminality for survival (Imobighe 2003).
Another way the Niger Delta is believed to be facing economic marginalization and political exclusion has to do with 
the high rate of poverty in the region. For example, poverty and unemployment in the area is higher than the national 
average, making the Delta a paradox of ‘affluence and affliction’ despite being the source of the oil wealth that keeps the 
nation afloat (Ibeanu 2008:1). Consequently, the political class in the Delta has since the late 1950s been agitating for 
adequate political representation, justice and equity in the management of their affairs against the Nigerian state and the 
oil multinationals operating in the region. 
The transnational oil companies operating in Nigeria such as Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC, a 
subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell), ChevronTexaco, ExxonMobil, TotalFinaElf, and a few others contribute mostly to the 
region’s environmental degradation. Oil spill and gas flaring constitute severe impacts rampant in the Niger Delta. For 
example, the amount of greenhouse effects from associated gas flared in the Niger Delta is the highest in the whole of 
Sub-Saharan Africa (Shaxson 2007). About 80 percent of the Delta population engages in fishing and farming occupations 
but environmental abuse by oil companies affects these livelihoods and exposes the local populace to poverty and misery 
(Omoweh 2005).
The Niger Delta conflict is not only protracted but also complex and multi-faceted because of its blend of ethnic and 
environmental claims, domestic politics, and international business (Wolff 2006). The conflict assumes ethnic dimensions 
as a result of intra- and inter-ethnic clashes that are largely driven by unbridled struggle for access to power and 
resources. Conflicts in the region date back to the pre-colonial era when some traditional nationalists resisted the 
colonialists. External rivalry aside, the competition for valuable resources in the region such as land and fishing grounds 
generated conflicts especially in notable city-states and towns such as Nembe, Kalabari, Okrika, Opobo, Brass, Aboh, and 
Bonny. Even piracy and enslavement were used as weapons against their neighbours by the disadvantaged tribes. For 
example, to date, the Itsekiris often refer to the Urhobos as their slaves, thereby creating ethnic tensions and conflicts 
(Ikime 2006).
The forms of conflict in the Niger Delta are numerous but sometimes insidious. Powerful elites and interest groups in 
the area have employed divisive tactics in their quest for self-determination, political restructuring, and resource control 
from the Nigerian state. First, they adopted a civic approach which dominated the early phase of the struggle that 
involved the use of constitutional means to seek socio-economic inclusion and environmental justice. Methods used 
included petitions to government authorities, sponsoring legislative motions, media blitz and forming political parties. For 
example, the use of petitions, especially by the Ogonis, intensified in the 1970s because of the huge oil spill at Kegbara 










Source: Tell, (February 18, 2008:25)
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Dere. Community agitation was checked by the promulgation of the obnoxious Land Use Decree in 1978 which ceded all 
lands to the government (Naanen 2007). 
The fear of majority ethnic domination in Nigeria’s violently divided federation led to the setting up of the Willink 
Commission in 1958, two years before independence in 1960. On the heels of independence, minority groups in the 
country especially in the Niger Delta had feared that they would be marginalized in independent Nigeria and had 
requested a separate region of their own. The concerns of the Commission for a special focus on the regions’ 
development needs and failure of government to realize this has continued to fuel agitation and conflict. Attempts at using 
the instrumentality of the party system especially by leaders such as Eyo Ita before 1960 and Dappa Biriye in the First 
Republic (1960-1966) to redress the Niger Delta question was part of this activism. 
Peaceful agitations soon graduated to rebellion against the state in 1966 by some young Ijaw soldiers. The ‘Twelve 
Days Rebellion’ or secessionist declaration of a ‘Niger Delta Republic’ by Adaka Boro and his associates signalled the 
second phase (Banigo 2008). Although this was crushed by the federal troops after less than two weeks, the seeds of 
violent struggle had been sown. Political agitations masquerading as resource conflicts became rampant, leading to civil 
war (1967-1970). Oil is central to the conflicts in what many believed was greed. The character of Nigeria’s economy 
changed radically soon after a commercial quantity of oil was discovered in the Ijaw village of Oloibiri in 1956. Though 
agriculture was the mainstay of Nigerian economy in the first republic (1960-1966), this altered in the oil boom years of 
the early 1970s. The outbreak of the Nigeria-Biafra Civil War had brought some structural changes in the federation 
whose four regions then were divided into twelve states in 1967, by the Gowon military regime, to make the Biafran 
secession unviable as the major oil wells were excised from the Biafran Igbo enclave. Though the war was considered lost 
by the Igbos, the federal government created the present Rivers State in 1967 to meet the demand for state creation for 
oil communities, and as a means to win the support of the ethnic minorities during the war (Nwajiaku-Dahou 2009). 
From the 1970s, oil assumed a phenomenal rise in the country’s economic calculus. Oil revenues which had 
accounted for only 0.1 per cent of government revenue in 1958/1959 went up to 17 per cent in 1969/1970, 84 per cent 
in 1980, 82 per cent in 1992 (Ikporukpo 2007). While the oil economy has further compounded Nigeria’s majority-
minority ethnic relations and fuelled primitive accumulation among the ruling class, it also enabled the military 
government to carry out post civil war reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation. Lagos, the capital of the country 
at that time, was transformed into a mega-city and the development of Abuja as a brand new city built from scratch 
commenced during the oil boom regime of Murtala Mohammed (Falola and Heaton 2008). That these cities owe their 
developmental strides to revenues from oil is a major source of grievance to ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta from 
whose land the ‘black gold’ is sourced.
Aside from the creation of the Rivers State in 1967, the hope of Niger Delta people for infrastructural development 
and general empowerment did not materialize as successive governments concentrated powers and resources at the na-
tional level, making Nigeria’s claim to federalism a mockery (Suberu 2008; Sagay 2004). To compound this, as oil rents 
grew, so too agitation and oil revenue allocation became intensely politicized. The centralization of resources and fiscal 
power was accentuated by military dictatorship through decrees. For example, Decree 13 of 1970 reduced the share of 
revenue based on derivation by 50 per cent (Obi 1998). The inordinate emphasis on equality of states, land mass and 
relative population, rather than derivation and social development needs, proved unfavourable to the Niger Delta people 
considered a minority in the Nigerian federation. The revenue formulas in place remain highly contentious and constitute 
a chief factor of a possibly genuine cry of marginalization and ensuing conflicts. 
The civic approach of engagement with its minimal success of state creation has not addressed the problems of the 
region; neither has outright rebellion. The changing face of activist environmentalism changed to a mass movement 
approach starting from the 1990s when Ken Saro-Wiwa began the mobilization of Ogoni communities. This third phase 
was characterized by non-violent protests, rallies, local and international campaigns against the excesses of oil companies 
and the Nigerian government, sensitization of communities to their rights, amongst others. This gradual mobilization 
culminated in the formation of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) in 1990. This social movement 
drew up the Ogoni Bill of Rights (OBR) and demanded political restructuring, local resource control, environmental 
protection, compensation for decades of environmental degradation, amongst other claims. MOSOP soon became a 
household name and probably the strongest force on earth against any multinational oil company (Agbonifo 2009; Naanen 
2007).
The response of government to MOSOP’s peaceful mobilization and activities was repressive. Rather than engaging 
with it, the rulers of the Nigerian state resorted to illegal imprisonment, torture, divide and rule strategies, and extra-
judicial murders (Okonta 2008). Things came to a head when on November 10, 1995 environmentalist Ken Saro-Wiwa 
and eight of his Ogoni kinsmen were executed by the state after a kangaroo trial in defiance of world leaders’ pleas. 
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Nigeria became a pariah state in the international community and was then suspended from the Commonwealth of 
Nations. 
This marked a watershed in environmentalism in Nigeria. Environmentalism soon engulfed the region as several ethnic 
groups and associations mushroomed from the mid-1990s onwards. In late 1998, youths from over 500 local 
communities gathered at Kaima community to discuss the plight of the region and demanded total resource control and 
self-determination as contained in the Kaima Declaration. The oil companies were asked to stop further exploration until 
the Niger Delta question was addressed. Government response to this threat was swift and violent as any form of 
opposition was crushed, with several people killed and many more arrested and detained. Similarly, oil conflicts and right 
of way between a youth gang and security agents which resulted in the death of about eight policemen in Odi, Bayelsa 
State led to the destruction of the community in 1999 by government forces. Hundreds of people were killed and 
property worth millions of Dollars was destroyed. These events, coupled with the gruesome murder of Ken Saro-Wiwa 
and his kinsmen, marked a watershed in the Niger Delta environmental struggle. It was becoming apparent that dialogue 
alone could not deliver on their agitation. By 1999, environmental activism had graduated into a fourth phase that has 
been referred to as “militia-zation” (Ikelegbe 2006) because of the eruption of various militant youth groups.
Militant environmentalism began around 1995 and blossomed by 2000. The militias are a mix of ideologues and 
purportedly represent the development aspirations of the people. They cut across ethnic protection, environmental 
activism, human rights defenders, and self-determination crusaders. Some of the popular fighter-groups include the 
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), the 
Niger Delta Vigilante Service (NDV), Iduwuni Volunteer Force (IVF), Butcher Squad, Martyr Brigade, Coalition of Militant 
Action of the Niger Delta (COMA), Movement of the Niger Delta People (MONDP), Expedition Force (NDEEF), and 
many more (Tuodolo 2008). 
Ironically, the return of the country to civil rule in 1999 after 16 years of continuous military dictatorship further 
increased the contour of conflict in the Niger Delta as these militias became politicians’ handmaidens in electoral politics 
and were used to harass political opponents and rig elections. Since these self-styled freedom fighters operated as a 
violent arm of some political elites, they also enjoyed protection from prosecution which aided their impunity; and were 
paid handsomely by their patrons (Ikelegbe 2008; DonPedro 2006). Perhaps these rewards for violence led to a further 
mushrooming of youth groups in the region in the 2000s to take advantage of the culture of violence.
Sharing the ‘national cake’
One area of conflict remains the inequity attendant on the dynamics between oil production and revenue sharing. As we 
have seen, how to ensure equity and justice in the distribution of oil rents has been highly controversial and conflictual. A 
historical survey of marginalization is pertinent to underscore its relevance to greed or grievance. Some revenue-sharing 
commissions established to address the issue included the Phillipson Commission of 1946, Hicks Commission of 1951, 
Chicks Commission of 1953, Raisman Commission of 1958, Binns Commission of 1964, Okigbo Commission of 1979, 
Aboyade Technical Committee of 1977, and in 1988 the Babangida administration set up the National Revenue 
Mobilization, Allocation and Fiscal Commission which since then has been performing the responsibility of revenue 
mobilization and sharing in Nigeria (Sagay 2004). The formula for revenue sharing remains problematic, however. 
Agitation for equitable revenue allocation by Niger Delta groups is producing positive results. They claimed as success 
the increased revenue from three percent revenue sharing formula to 13 percent in 1999 that became operational in 
2000. As Table 2 shows, between 1999 and 2007, the Niger Delta states of Bayelsa, Delta, Akwa Ibom and Rivers ranked 
first, third, fourth and fifth respectively as the largest recipients of federal government revenue allocations. These revenue 
in-flows which represent a huge proportion of the total revenues have become a sort of booty through militants’ 
environmentalism. Ironically, in spite of the in-flows, these states remain hotbeds of insurgency and agitations against the 
state.
The flow of resources into the region has not deterred militancy. The oil companies have increased their corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) to their host communities especially since the late 1990s when their ‘social license’ to operate 
was threatened. Shell in its Annual 2006 Report stated that it spent the sum of $53 million on community projects in the 
Niger Delta in 2006 (Shell 2007). It also contributed over $44 million to the Niger Delta Development Commission, plus 
paying over US$34 billion to the Nigerian state in taxes and royalties between 2006 and 2010 alone (Nigerian Tribune, 
March 2, 2010). The conflict is inevitable since Shell’s development partnership by its selective implementation breeds 
conflicts in the communities, alters local economies, and changes forms of cultural relations in the localities (Zalik 2004). 
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Similar poverty alleviation projects by the European Commission (EC) in its Micro Project Programme valued at 71 
million Euros has been expended in the region (Odiegwu, 2009; Iyayi 2005). 
Table 2 Nigeria: Federal revenue allocation to states, 1999-2007
S/No. States Population 2006 Allocation 1999-2007 N Per Capital Allocation Ranking
1 Abia 2,833,999 180,913,356,049.45 63,836.78 14th
2 Adamawa 3,168,101 200,358,588,269.16 63,242.49 15th
3 Akwa Ibom 3,920,208 495,266,604,843.58 126,336.82 4th
4 Anambra 4,182,032 183,439,623,354.30 43,863.75 34th
5 Bauchi 4,676,465 227,082,096,536.85 48,558.49 31st
6 Bayelsa 1,703,358 452,260,540,942.94 265,511.15 1st
7 Benue 4,219,244 221,639,773,288.79 52,530.68 27th
8 Borno 4,151,193 242,143,511,536.62 58,331.07 23rd
9 Cross River 2,888,966 190,394,175,888.13 65,903.92 12th
10 Delta 4,098,391 561,421,465,722.84 136,985.82 3rd
11 Ebonyi 2,173,501 149,606,220,047.59 67,911.73 11th
12 Edo 3,218,332 196,650,837,309.93 61,103.34 18th
13 Ekiti 2,384,212 152,866,276,435.50 64,116.06 13th
14 Enugu 3,257,298 172,943,975,753.31 53,094.31 26th
15 FCT, Abuja 1,405,201 193,027,632,752.09 137,366.56 2nd
16 Gombe 2,353,879 146,500,259,934.10 62,237.80 16th
17 Imo 3,934,899 231,384,556,606.10 58,803.18 22nd
18 Jigawa 4,348,649 225,625,079,684.13 51,883.95 29th
19 Kaduna 6,066,562 256,110,734,255.77 42,216.78 35th
20 Kano 9,383,682 370,935,172,516.81 39,529.81 36th
21 Katsina 5,792,578 280,544,163,809.26 48,431.66 32nd
22  Kebbi 3,238,628 196,139,911,137.47 60,562.66 19th
23 Kogi 3,278,487 195,125,198,336.31 59,516.84 21st
24 Kwara 2,371,089 165,588,098,911.35 69,836.31 10th
25 Lagos 9,013,534 311,928,495,035.61 34,606.68 37th
26 Nasarawa 1,863,275 145,006,177,121.79 77,823.28 6th
27 Niger 3,950,249 237,369,691,547.30 60,089.81 20th
28 Ogun 3,728,098 195,378,106,884.06 52,406.91 28th
29 Ondo 3,441,024 257,395,751,810.07 74,802.08 9th
30 Osun 3,423,535 210,051,538,274.76 61,355.16 17th
31 Oyo 5,591,589 263,298,045,707.53 47,088.23 33rd
32 Plateau 3,178,712 155,194,100,865.61 48,822.95 30th
33 Rivers 5,185,400 621,996,274,440.22 119,951.46 5th
34 Sokoto 3,696,999 214,300,345,320.76 57,966.03 24th
35 Taraba 2,300,736 176,332,044,844.11 76,641.58 7th
36 Yobe 2,321,591 177,230,732,544.09 76,340.02 8th
37 Zamfara 3,259,846 182,989,541,536.86 56,134.41 25th
NIGERIA 140,003,542 9,056,438,699,855.15 64,687.21
Source: compiled by the authors from government revenue allocations. Nigeria’s N1 is equivalent to about 
US$160
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Institutionalized corruption and legitimization of violence
The nation seems to thrive on the politics of disorder that has institutionalized corruption and legitimized violence. 
Though the prebendal and corrupt character of Nigerian politics has been well noted in the literature (Okecha 2009; 
Ibeanu and Luckham 2007; Smith 2007; Watts 2005; Joseph 1987), yet the Niger Delta experience is puzzling as huge rev-
enue inflows into the neo-patrimonial sub-national units have resulted in power tussle by the elite who engage in zero-
sum competition to capture the disbursements (Suberu 2008; Collier 2007; Watts 2007; Eberlein 2006). 
 Many government officials have been indicted for the development failure of the region. On 15 September 2005, 
Governor Diepreye Alamieyeseigha of Bayelsa State (the largest recipient of federal oil revenues between 1999 and 
2007) was arrested by British security officials in a London airport for laundering up to the tune of £1.8 million among 
other charges. He was later placed under house arrest after paying $1.25 million. He, however, jumped bail in London 
and appeared in Bayelsa State on 20 November, 2005 (Watts 2007). He was later tried and convicted in Nigeria. Similarly, 
the former governor of Edo State 1999-2007 (another state in the Niger Delta region), Lucky Igbinedion, also pleaded 
guilty to corruption and money laundering charges. 
The case of James Ibori, former Delta State governor (1999-2007; and the third largest recipient of oil revenues in 
Table 2), was more dramatic. Ibori was arrested and charged to court in Nigeria for corruption and money laundering 
charges. Curiously, he was discharged and acquitted of all 170 count charges on December 17 2010 by Justice Marcel 
Awokulehin at Asaba, Delta State. The justice said that the prosecution had failed to show “critical collaborative evidence. 
Thus, I accordingly hold that the prosecution failed to make a prima facie case in any of all the 170 count charges, so I 
quash and dismiss all the 170 count charges against him” (Ezea 2010:16). Many saw this as one of the biggest ‘sales of 
justice’ in the country. 
As the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) made attempts to re-arrest Ibori for retrial using fresh 
evidence, he fled the country and was later arrested in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, on May 12, 2010 by the Interpol and 
he was extradited to the United Kingdom for trial. On February 27, 2012, Ibori pleaded guilty to the ten count charges 
preferred against him at the Southark Crown Court in London. These charges bordered on money laundering, 
corruption and other financial crimes to the tune of over $250 million. He is currently serving a 13-year jail term in the 
UK. His wife, sister and lawyer were earlier convicted by the same court for aiding and abetting these crimes. The trios 
are serving five years jail terms each (Ajaero 2012). 
At the moment, several executive members of the Bayelsa State government have been indicted by the EFCC for al-
legedly defrauding the state of over N150 billion (Nigerian Compass March 28, 2010). In Nigeria, officials are not only 
corrupt, but corruption is official (Umejei 2009: E9). As shown, corruption has largely become ‘democratized’ (Human 
Rights Watch 2007; Peel 2005). Over time, genuine grievances have been overtaken by greed. Even ‘democratic’ 
elections are now largely ‘incredible’ because they are characterized by vote-buying, ballot-stuffing, political thuggery and 
several other malpractices (Kew 2007; Agbaje and Adejumobi 2006). 
 Militants’ environmentalism has led to generalized insecurity and made politically-motivated killings largely the norm. 
Political opponents are eliminated extra-judicially in unbridled quest for power and oil largesse. As correctly noted by 
Amuwo (2009:38), for the Nigerian ruling class, oil wealth remains the largest motivation for political power and it is this 
obsession and fixation that explains the elite’s “intrusive and offensive mentality”. The World Bank estimates that, “about 
80 per cent of Nigeria’s oil and gas revenues accrues to just one per cent of the population” (Igbikiowubo, 2004:15). And 
it has been estimated that a greater chunk of the $18-20 billion that the Nigerian state earns annually feeds political venal-
ity (Ifeka 2004). 
The Nigerian oil industry is said to be the conduit through which a cabal of a few influential individuals manipulates the 
economy in their own personal interests. Recently, a government official disclosed that about N600 billion out of 
government subsidy on fuel every year “goes to the pockets of just a few persons who constitute the cabal” (Ogbodo 
2009:21). Indeed, the National Assembly was rocked by a $3 million oil subsidy bribery scandal in much of 2012. Even 
members of the parliament admit that the “National Assembly has a credibility problem” (see interview with Minority 
Whip of the House of Representatives by Suleiman 2012: 48). The New York based Global Financial Integrity Report 
reveals that between 1970 and 2008 alone, Africa lost a total of $854 billion as a result of illicit financial outflows. 
Expectedly, Nigeria topped the list with a total illicit outflow of $89.5 billion. These revenues flight exceeded 
development aid to Nigeria at a ratio of 2 to 1 (The Punch March 31, 2010).
The character of the Niger Delta conflict is convoluted and linked to a nexus of political corruption and violent 
militancy where criminality has largely become an “instrument of the struggle” (Ikelegbe 2008; Watts 2007; Ifeka 2004). 
Elite’s unbridled tussle for political power has given rise to the recruitment of unemployed youth as thugs and for other 
criminal activities, making the roles of youth in the interface between development and security ambivalent (Olawale and 
Alao 2007, see also Stern and Ojendal 2010). In August 2007 alone, over 50 lives were lost as a result of gang rivalries. 
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Militant leaders were locked in a power tussle over political spoils. Armed militants in the guise of agitation perpetrated 
different criminal activities including hostage-taking, armed robbery, killing and maiming of innocent citizens (Osumah and 
Aghedo 2011). 
This fragmentation of political order led to the setting up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in Rivers State 
in 2008. The Commission which had 215 memoranda as well as several testimonies and evidences, attributed the 
problems of Rivers State in particular and Niger Delta in general to governance, politics, cultism, chieftaincy and 
insurgency that were interwoven. The Commission blamed the remote cause of conflict on the neglect of the area and 
the immediate causes on political tussle by power elite who employed insurgents to devastate opponents and their 
constituencies. According to Justice Eso, Chairman of the Commission “a place like Okuru-Ama, Amadi-Ama were 
completely razed to the ground with the government of the day looking the other way” (Eso 2009:96).
Peace-building efforts in the Niger Delta were politicized, poorly implemented and therefore ineffective. In one 
attempt at peace restoration, the Rivers State government raised militants’ expectations by paying N250,000 each for 
guns collected from them when the price of a new gun was N125,000 at the time. This made militancy more fashionable 
and lucrative. Justice Eso castigated President Obasanjo for heightening the profile of Tom Ateke and Asari Dokubo by 
wining and dining with them at Aso Rock and flying them in presidential jets, all in the name of fostering peace in the Niger 
Delta (Eso 2009). These militant leaders were culpable for the death of thousands of persons and destruction of several 
communities. For example, dynamite and bomb blasts were reportedly used by Tom Ateke-led Niger Delta Vigilante 
(NDV) to destroy Bukuma, Tombia, Buguma and Ogbakiri communities in Rivers State because of the supremacy tussle 
between him and Asari Dokubo (DonPedro 2006). Despite knowledge of this criminality by the topmost echelon of 
government, no charges were brought against the perpetrators. This may imply state acceptance of their activities that 
bother either on genuine grievance or criminality to draw attention to their cause.
The lucrativeness of militancy is helped by its access to crude oil through what is called ‘oil bunkering’. This 
horrendous theft of crude oil has also been attributed to the complicity between some militants, politicians, civil servants, 
ex- and serving military officers, businessmen, and several individuals and groups (Eberlein 2006; Ifeka 2004). Bunkering 
involves the installation of a tap into the crude oil pipeline to siphon it. The siphoned oil is loaded into barges which dis-
lodge their cargo into bigger ships waiting at sea. From there, the ships disappear to international markets. The bunkering 
cartel in the Niger Delta is said to make as much as $60m a day. This explains why the perpetrators will do anything to 
protect the lucrative business. 
President Yar’Adua had admitted that an international cartel was involved in Nigerian ‘blood oil,’ akin to the ‘blood di-
amonds’ of Liberia and Sierra Leone (Africa Research Bulletin (2008:17613). It is alleged that the money realized from the 
crude theft is used to finance political activities, insurgency and other business interests (Cumins and Beasant 2005). As 
shown in Table 3 the country lost over $20 million in 2008 alone. Furthermore, there is also a growing wave of kidnapping 
for ransom among militants. This has led to the abduction of thousands of expatriate oil workers and other people for 
huge ransoms. Initially, only foreign oil workers were kidnapped, but this has since been extended to wealthy indigenes 
and their relatives including aged people and school children (Osumah and Aghedo 2011; Onovo 2009). 
Table 3 Nigeria: Quantity of oil loss in barrels per day and amount in US Dollars for 2008
S/N Month
Estimated Qty of 
Barrels of Oil 
Loss Per Day
Total Barrels of 
Oil Loss for the 
Month
OPEC Basket 
Price for Bonny 
Light Crude Oil 
for the Month in 
US Dollars
Total Amount Loss for 
the Month in US 
Dollars (million)
1 January 700,000 21,700,000 88.35 1,917,195,000
2. February 700,000 20,300,000 90.64 1,839,992,000
3. March 700,000 21,700,000 99.03 2,148,951,000
4. April 700,000 21,700,000 105.16 2,208,360,000
5. May 700,000 21,700,000 119.16 2,590,763,000
6. June 700,000 21,700,000 128.33 2,694,930,000
7. July 700,000 21,700,000 131.22 2,847,474,000
8. August 700,000 21,700,000 112.41 1,633,793,000
9. September 700,000 21,700,000 96.85 2,439,297,000
10. Grand Total $20,720,842,000
Source: ewswatch (May 4, 2009:19)
46  
Inkanyiso, Jnl Hum & Soc Sci 2012, 4(1)
There is a sense of outright criminality by some militant groups propelled by greed. A recently concluded quantitative 
survey which pooled 1,500 respondents drawn from the Niger Delta found that the majority of local people who joined 
the militant groups had no sense of grievance and those who had a sense of grievance were not likely to participate in 
violent militancy (Oyefusi 2008). The discourse of grievance is now largely being employed as a political strategy for 
personal economic agendas by large segments of various actors who are benefiting hugely from the political economy of 
the resource conflict. In official circles, the Niger Delta militants were seen as criminals: “Those people are criminal 
elements. Don’t look at all this propaganda of theirs”, stated President Yar’Adua in an interview with The Guardian (April 
30 2009:9). Yet a few weeks later, the same president granted unconditional amnesty to all the militants including Henry 
Okah who was standing trial for treason and gun-running. Government’s agreement to dialogue means that there were 
some merits in the demands of the insurgents. 
The amnesty programme had resulted in a phenomenal increase in Nigerian oil production as some level of peace 
returned to the region. Government commendation for the initiative came from local and international quarters including 
the United Nations. However, the amnesty deal has not engendered sustainable peace owing to poor implementation 
and corruption. Ex-militants have protested publicly in Edo, Bayelsa, Rivers, and Akwa Ibom States over government 
failure to pay, accommodate, and train them as contained in the amnesty agreement. Also, the N50 billion budgeted for 
the programme has become a veritable source of conflict as members of the amnesty implementation committee, local 
politicians as well as influential militant leaders are locked in a tussle for the largesse. Three years after its initiation, the 
peace deal has failed to address the historical grievances of the region which have been anchored on sustainable 
development, environmental security, and political restructuring. Already, some ex-militants are threatening a return to 
the creeks to continue with their ‘struggle’. The MEND claimed responsibility for the October 1, 2010 Independence 
Day bomb blast in Abuja in which several lives were lost as well as the bomb explosion in Warri and Yenagoa. Some 
disenchanted ex-militants were also implicated in the gang rape at the University of Port Harcourt in November 2009 and 
some armed robbery and kidnapping incidents (Ebiri 2010; Aaron 2005). 
Conclusion
This paper has deployed the greed and grievance thesis to demonstrate how they manifested in a mutually reinforcing 
pattern in the Niger Delta resource conflicts. We examined the nature of the conflict by an assessment of the key actors, 
motivations and their interrelationship in the conflict situation. 
We argue that from the late 1970s onwards environmental activism waged by the oil-bearing Niger Delta communi-
ties that was civic in nature gradually metamorphosed into a violent agitation involving power tussle to capture oil and de-
velopment largesse. Since then, though grievance remains justified as a constant variable, it is also propelling greed. 
Indeed, large segments of both state officials and militant youth groups in the region have largely been driven by greed 
rather than the quest for environmental justice. Hence, some militants by their involvements in oil bunkering, political 
thuggery, ransom kidnapping, killing of innocent people and other crimes, seem to have more in common with the rent-
seeking, profligate and power-hungry political elite than freedom fighters. To these actors, the Niger Delta is more profit-
able in conflict than in peace. This poses a serious threat to the peace-building effort. 
 As noted by David Keen (2008), the commonsense notion of conflict as a contest between two or more actors is 
reductionist, as is the conception of conflict as a kind of breakdown. As shown by the Niger Delta case, resource wars 
can be profitable to a lot of conflict actors. This profitability makes the quest for peace and stability a herculean task as 
profiteers will do their utmost to maintain the system of spoils. Until the motivations and vested interests of the conflict 
actors (state officials, oil multinationals and militants alike) are clearly identified and interrogated; justice done to 
perpetrators of conflict; and adequate compensation given to conflict victims, the quest for peace in the Niger Delta will 
largely remain a mirage.
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